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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HEBER D. NELSON, et al, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD STOKER, et al, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18244 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant, the State of Utah Department of Social Services 
and Patricia Kunz, is appealing from a judgment granting Plaintiffsv 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which judgment determined the priority 
of liens on certain real property located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court, Honorable G. Hal Taylor, determined the 
priority of liens giving first priority to a Trust Deed securing 
obligations owing to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, giving 
second priority to the Plaintiffs' Trust Deed securing unpaid 
balance of purchase price, granting third priority to a judgment 
against Defendant Richard W. ~toker, granting fourth priority to 
Appellant State of Utah Department of Social Services and Patricia 
Kunz, and granting fifth priority to Tom Darnell and Diane Truscott, 
mortgagees. Only the Utah Department of Social Services and Patricia 
Kunz appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have a priority granted the Utah Department 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
of Social Services and Patricia Kunz higher than awarded by the 
Court and prior to the second priority granted Respondents' 
purchase money Trust Deed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff cannot accept the Statement of Facts as contained 
in the brief of Appellant as the Statement does not state the facts 
in the light most favorable to the decision made by the District 
Court. 
The Court made Findings of Fact after the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was argued and presented in open court and all parties 
appeared before the court. Plaintiffs filed an Affidavit, which 
Affidavit was not contradicted by any party and which is supported 
by the documentary evidence examined by the Court at the time the 
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard. 
The undisputed facts are that on or about the 4th of June, 
1979, Plaintiffs and the Defendants Richard W. Stoker and LaNae S. 
Stoker entered into an agreement for the purchase by Defendants 
Stoker of all of Lot 11, Pioneer Estates No. 3 Subdivision, located 
in Salt Lake County. Plaintiffs deeded by Warranty Deed to the 
Stokers the property involved. This deed is shown by Exhibit 2-P 
which was presented to the court and is now in the file. At the 
same time, in payment of the purchase price, Stokers executed and 
delivered a Trust Deed, which is Exhibit 3-P, securing the unpaid 
purchase price of $8,464.76. The Warranty Deed and Trust Deed 
were recorded.by McGhie Land Title at the same moment as shown by 
the filing stamp on the documents, i.e. 12:35 P.M. on June s, 1979. 
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The Warranty Deed was subject to a Western Mortgage Loan 
Corporation Trust Deed in the face amount of $40,700.00 executed 
by Plaintiffs. Stokers made no downpayment and only one monthly 
payment. 
The Affidavit of Plaintiff states his opinion that the 
property value does not exceed the balance owing on the Western 
Morgage Loan Corporation loan and the unpaid balance owing Plaintiff 
on the purchase price represented by the Trust Deed, Exhibit 3-P. 
On June 5, 1979 Defendant Richard W. Stoker was a judgment 
debtor owing a debt to Ray Quintana, dba Silver Way, in the amount 
of $1,038.17, costs of $13.80, and an attorney's fee of $350.00, 
item #8 on the foreclosure report, Exhibit 1. Judgment was dated 
January 13, 1977 and filed on the 14th of January, 1977. 
There was also a judgment against Richard W. Stoker to the 
State of Utah Department of Social Services and Patricia Kunz in 
the amount of $21,610.00 dated February 23, 1979 and filed on 
March 16, 1979. 
The Affidavit of Plaintiff further stated that he did not 
appreciate the significance of the judgments against his buyer at 
the time the Warranty Deed was given Stokers and the Trust Deed 
taken back to secure the purchase price, or he did not observe 
that these obligations were on the title report supplied to him 
by McGhie Land Title. 
It is undisputed that the Appellant did not know of the 
transaction between the Plaintiffs and Defendants Stoker and did 
not have any interest in said transaction, nor did they give any 
consideration for an interest in the real property of Defendants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
Stoker. The Affidavit of Heber D. Nelson is pages 28 and 29 of 
the Record on Appeal. 
The Court made Findings of Fact finding the items as recited 
herein that were undisputed and took into consideration the 
Affidavit, statement of counsel, foreclosure report on the real 
property, the Warranty Deed, and the Trust Deed that are described 
(R. 42-43), and found that none of the parties were aware of the 
transaction between the Plaintiffs and Defendant Stoker and that 
no party had relied upon there being a property interest in Stokers 
for extension of credit or in any other way which might have been 
detrimental to them. 
Based on the Findings of Fact, the Court then determined that 
the priority of liens on Lot 11, Pioneer Estates No. 3 Subdivision, 
were as tollows: 
(1) Priority No. 1 was granted to the Trust Deed, face 
amount of $40,700.00, to Western Loan Mortgage Corporation, recorded 
March 20, 1978. 
(2) It granted second priority to the Trust Deed to Plaintiffs 
for $8,464.76 securing the purchase price of the property agreed 
upon between Plaintiffs and Defendants Stoker. 
(3) Third priority was granted to Ray Quintana, dba Silver 
Way, judgment. 
(4) Fourth priority was granted to the State of Utah Department 
of Social Services and Patricia Kunz, Appellants, whose judgment 
is in the amount of $21,610.00. 
(5) Fifth priority was granted to the Defendants Tom Darnell 
and Diane Truscott based on the mortgage recorded March 18, 1981. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEITHER PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND 
STOKERS EXPECTED THE APPELLANT TO OBTAIN AN INTEREST IN 
THE REAL PROPERTY WITH PRIORITY AHEAD OF PLAINTIFFS. 
It is a fundamental principle of equity that no one shall be 
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another by 
reason of an innocent mistake of law or fact. Appellant asks 
this Court to give it a priority over the Respondents by reason 
of the fact that Respondents and Stoker made a mistake of law or 
fact, or both, in placing title in Stoker after the judgment 
against him had been entered of record on behalf of Appellant. 
It is respectfully submitted that recognizing the position of 
Respondents can injure no one and deny to anyone rights that justice 
entitles them to. 
The equity courts over the years have_ had difficulty relieving 
people from mistakes of law since the exact status of any 
particular legal principle is always difficult to ascertain. 
However, where the mistake, if it is a mistake of law rather than 
a fact, relates to a title situation, courts have universally held 
that a party may be relieved of the consequences of his mistake 
and granted equitable relief where no person is harmed by such a 
resolution. This Court, in the case of Sine v. Rudy, 27 Utah 2d 
67, 493 P.2d 299, recognized that equity would relieve people from 
mistaken beliefs as to what the status or legal condition of property 
concerned in their transaction actually was. 
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The texts seemed to be unanimous in concurring that equity 
jurisdiction gives the right to relieve against mistakes, especially 
where they are mutual on the part of parties to a transaction. 
See 30 C.J.S., §47, pg 868, etc., and 27 Am.Jur.2d, §28, pg 552. 
There has been no doubt that the equity court had power to 
relieve parties from the consequence of mistakes of fact. Less 
clear has been the proposition that the court would relieve parties 
of the consequences of a mistake as to law. Many of the cases, 
however, contain both mistakes as to law and to fact, and in those 
cases the courts are able to relieve a party of the mistake where 
no one is harmed and a failure to relieve would cause unjust 
enrichment. 27 AmJur.2d, §28, pg 552 through §37, pg 560. 
A great number of cases support the principle and illustrate 
the manner in which equity intervenes to do justice. One of the 
early cases which has been often quoted and cited as good law is 
Cherry v. Welsher, 195 Iowa 640, 192 N.W. 149 (1923). The rule 
recited fits the facts before the court in this case: 
"This record, however, shows a release of an unsatisfied 
incumbrance, and the lien so released will be revived for 
the benefit of the party satisfying it. Justice and equity 
require that this should be done. When a person through 
misapprehension and mistkake of the law parts with or 
surrenders a right of property which he would not have 
surrendered but for such misapprehension, a court of equity 
will grant relief, if it is satisfied that the parties 
benefited by the mistake cannot in conscience retain the 
benefits or advantages so acquired. Botorff v. Lewis, 
121 Iowa 27, 95 N.W. 262; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 
pp. 398 and 418. A court of equity will not permit a 
party to take and enjoy the benefits of ignorance or 
mistake of law on the part of another party who knew 
and who did not correct. Faxom et al v. Baldwin, 136 
Iowa, 519, 114 N.W. 40; 2 Pomeroy, eq.Jur. (3d Ed.} 
§§721, 847." 
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For similar ruling see also Prudential Insurance Company of 
America v. Nuernberger, et al, 135 Neb. 743, 284 N.W. 266. Cases 
which also accept the general proposition cited in Am.Jur. are 
Cooper County Bank v. Bank of Bunceton, 221 Mo. 814, 288 S.W. 95, 
where the Missouri Supreme Court stated the law in the following 
language: 
"The remaining point for our consideration is the 
question of rescission. It is plaintiff's contention 
that a contract entered into under a mutual misconception 
of the legal rights of the parties amounting to a mistake 
of law is as amenable to rescission as one founded in a 
mistake of fact. It is urged that, being an equity case, 
where an unconscionable advantage has been gained by a 
mere mistake or misapprehension, equity will interfere 
in order to prevent intolerable injusticeo" 
See also the following cases: Norard Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. 
Orinoko Mills, 416 Penn. 454, 206 A.2d 56; Peter v. Peter, 
343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846; and Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & 
Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044. The rule granting relief 
is set down in the following language: 
"The rule that permits relief to one who enters into 
a transaction ignorant of his antecedent existing legal 
rights is well recognized. It is stated by Pomeroy on 
Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) §849, as follows: 
'Wherever a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect 
to his own antecedent and existing private legal rights, 
interests, estates, duties, liabilities, or other 
relations either of property or contract, or personal 
status, and enters into some transaction the legal scope 
and operation of which he correctly apprehends and 
understands, for the purpose of affecting such assumed 
rights, interests, or relations, or of carrying out such 
assumed duties or liabilities, equity will grant its 
relief, defensive or affirmative, treating the mistake 
as analogous to, if not identical with, a mistake of fact.' " 
See also Mitchell v. California-Pacific Title Ins. Co., et al, 
248 P. 1035; Barkhausen, et al v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank 
& Trust Co. of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d, 120 N.E.2d 649. 
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In the case of S. S. Pierce Co. v. United States, 17 F.Supp. 
667, the District Court stated the law and authority supporting 
the fundamental legal principle espoused by Respondent: 
"While it is often laid down as a general rule that 
equity will not relieve against a mistake of law, Bank 
of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 9 L.Ed. 989, 
the rule is no doubt subject to exceptions. One such 
exception arises where an instrument is given under a 
mistake as to the antecedent rights of the parties. 
In such cases, it is said that equity may give relief, 
although that mistake be the result of ignorance of the 
most fundamental legal principles. Williston on Contracts, 
§1589; Clifton Manufacturing Company v. United States 
(C.C.A.4th, 1935) 76 F.(2d) 577; Order of United 
Commercial Travelers of America v. McAdam (C.C.A.8th) 
125 F. 358; Reggio v. Warren, 297 Mass. 525, 93 N.E. 805, 
32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 340, 20 Ann. Cas. 1244; Renard v. Clink, 
91 Mich. ~' 51 N.W. 692, 30 AmSt. Rep. 458. The present 
case probably falls within this exception. But a further . 
qualification must be noted. The power to set aside an 
instrument because of mistake is based upon equitable 
principles, and is to be exercised only for the purpose 
of preventing unjust enrichment." 
If the Court accepts the ruling by the trial judge, the end 
result will be that the State will get exactly what it had prior 
to the transaction between Plaintiffs and Stoker, the parties to 
the transaction will be given the exact items they had prior to 
the transaction, and no one will be unjustly enriched. To accept 
the proposition that the State can in some way obtain a lien on 
premises of Plaintiff a ahead of their second Trust Deed must be 
based on a doctrine that the State is entitled to be unjustly 
enriched when no other person can claim such rights. 
POINT II 
STOKER HAD NO PROPERTY ON WHICH THE LIEN FOR 
SUPPORT OF HIS CHILDREN COULD ATTACH. 
The judicial Code provisions providing for support of minor 
children are clear in their provisions. Section 78-45b-l.1 
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clearly states that the resources of responsible parents are to 
be appropriated for support of the parents' minor children. 
On February 23, 1979, the date of the judgment in favor of 
Appellant, Stoker had no interest whatsoever in the real property 
subject to the liens in question. Other than for a momentary 
existence, Stoker never had any interest in the real property in 
which the Appellant now seeks to have a oien for child support. 
Respondents in no way are responsible for the support of 
Stoker's children and their property, under the Public Support of 
Children provisions, is not property that the State of Utah has 
ever claimed should be appropriated for the support of another's 
children. Appellant cites Section 78-45b-9 which provides for 
the docketing of the judgment for support provided by the State. 
Said provision states as follows: 
"When so filed and docketed the award shall constitute 
a lien from the time of such docketing upon the real 
and personal property of the obliger .... " 
Respondents submit that what the Appellant is attempting to 
do is to make the award a lien on property owned by Respondents 
since giving the lien of the State priority ahead of Respondents' 
recorded Trust Deed would take the property of Respondents to pay 
the debts of Defendant Stoker. 
The decision of the trial court gives the State of Utah 
everything that the statutory provisions cited say it is entitled 
to. The basic equity rule that the trial court applied granted 
Respondents their property rights. The judgment prevented unjust 
enrichment of the State of Utah. Stoker never did have any 
substantial interest in the real property subject to the liens 
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on which priority was determined. The State is awarded everything 
Stoker ever had by the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's decision 
reached a fair and equitable resolution of the matter at issue. 
That this Court should affirm the trial court judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1982. 
KING and PETERSON 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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